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Studies show that people tend to provide overly narrow confidence intervals for unknown 
values. Such a form of overconfidence would have an important impact on financial markets, 
among other domains, leading i.a. to excessive trading. The present study is one of the very 
few that try to incentivize reporting correct confidence intervals. To this end, a reward scheme 
is proposed, based on a combination of asymmetric loss functions minimized by appropriate 
quantiles of a probability distribution. In the experiment I find that incentivized subjects 
provide wider confidence intervals, obtaining a higher hit rate than the control group. The 
effect is stronger than that of feedback and explicit warning. These findings suggest that the 
overly narrow confidence intervals reported elsewhere are partly due to an insufficient mental 













C44, C91, D03, D84, G17 1 Introduction
Everyday conversations often involve uncertain values expressed in terms of
intervals (such as “a women in her thirties was here between 4:00 and 4:30,
looking for you”) that are expected to cover the true value with high prob-
ability. Also experts in various domains are frequently asked to make range
predictions or judgments, perhaps at pre-speciﬁed levels of conﬁdence. The
method is useful because it gives a sense of degree of uncertainty involved,
without forcing those generating or using the prediction to deal with entire
subjective probability distributions. Experimental research in psychology
shows, however, that people tend to be overconﬁdent about the precision of
their knowledge and ability to predict. In a typical design, subjects would be
asked to submit a 90% conﬁdence interval (CI) for a value that they are be-
lieved not to know precisely (such as the length of the Rhine) or a value that
cannot be known yet (such as the value of Dow Jones a month later). It is usu-
ally found that the intervals are too narrow on average as few as about 50%
may actually cover the relevant value. This form of overconﬁdence appears to
be particularly robust (Klayman, Soll, Gonz´ alez-Vallejo, and Barlas 1999).1
In particular, studies tend to conclude that experts (McKenzie, Liersch, and
Yaniv 2008), particularly professional traders (Oberlechner and Osler 2008)
and CFOs (Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey 2010) do as poorly as students
or worse. Consequently, interval overconﬁdence has been proposed to have an
important impact on ﬁnancial markets. Theoretical models allowing underes-
timation of information signal variance, which is parallel to overly narrow CIs,
can, among other things, explain excessive trading (see e.g. Glaser, Langer,
and Weber (2007) for an overview). Empirically, Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and
Pouget (2005) ﬁnd that overconﬁdent subjects perform worse in an experi-
mental market. On the other hand, the hypothesized link between interval
overconﬁdence and trade volume at the individual level was not present in
the ﬁeld study of professional traders (Glaser and Weber 2007).2 Recently,
the impact of biased interval judgment on corporate ﬁnance is beginning to
be investigated. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2010) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with
overconﬁdent ﬁnancial executives tend to invest more.
There are numerous studies aimed at reducing overconﬁdence in inter-
vals by manipulating the details of the elicitation mode (e.g. asking subjects
to additionally provide their best guess, see Speirs-Bridge, Fidler, McBride,
Flander, Cumming, and Burgman (2010), Soll and Klayman (2004) and re-
1See, however, (Budescu and Du 2007) that only ﬁnds slight overconﬁdence at 90%
conﬁdence level and slight underconﬁdence at :50% level.
2In contrast, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) ﬁnd that a generic assessment of overcon-
ﬁdence is predictive of subsequent trading volume in a large sample of Finnish investors.
1quiring probability to be assigned to each possible interval, Haran, Moore,
and Morewedge (2010) or by asking to think about “improbably” high and
low values, see (Teigen and Jørgensen 2005), experiment 4) or by provid-
ing detailed feedback (Bolger and Onkal-Atay 2004). While some beneﬁcial
eﬀects of these methods are well-documented, they do not seem to reduce
the bias entirely; they generally lack formal theoretical underpinning; their
relevance to some real-world applications may be limited; ﬁnally, there is
always a threat that they may lead to “overshooting” – as long as the sample
is strongly overconﬁdent, any manipulation leading to wider intervals will
“improve calibration” as measured at group level (see Murphy and Stevens
(2004), for a similar debate on hypothetical bias).
While many diﬀerent remedies have been proposed, it remains unknown
whether or not suﬃcient monetary incentives could reduce the bias – nearly
all of controlled studies on interval overconﬁdence involved hypothetical ques-
tions.3 Overconﬁdence outside of the lab, on the other hand, may be quite
costly to the decision maker.
The goal of this study is to establish whether the tendency to set overly
narrow CIs indeed persists when an individual faces ﬁnancial incentives to
report them carefully. Clearly, providing CIs reﬂecting one’s best judgment
requires certain mental eﬀort that individuals may not be willing to make.
Furthermore, one can be more proud getting it right and less ashamed missing
it after having submitted quite a narrow interval.4 The general trade-oﬀ
between accuracy and informativeness inherent in interval estimation tasks
has been studied i.a. by Yaniv and Foster (1995). Until now, however, to the
best of my knowledge, no simple strategy to incentivize CIs has been tested.
5 This is in stark contrast to a very closely related task, namely probability
judgments, where proper scoring rules (PSR) have been known for several
3Most authors conﬁne themselves to the remark that direct rewarding of proper cal-
ibration (e.g. having nine out of 10 intervals actually cover the true values when the
required conﬁdence level is 90%) should lead suﬃciently smart subjects to provide nine
unreasonably wide intervals and one very narrow. A much more subtle dynamic method
of interval width adjustment may be applied when judges receive immediate feedback; it
may well be used by experts in the ﬁeld, trying to appear properly calibrated.
4A software developer told Jørgensen, Teigen, and Moløkken (2004) “I feel that if I
estimate very wide [conﬁdence intervals for work hours required in the project], this will
be interpreted as a total lack of competence [...] I’d rather have fewer actual values inside
the minimum-maximum interval, than providing meaningless, wide [intervals].” See also
Study D in the same paper and extreme miscalibration of software developers reported
in (Connolly and Dean 1997). Polish Central Bank, on the other hand, seems to be
immune to this kind of concerns. In February 2010 it predicted at just 50% conﬁdence
level (though correctly, as it later turned out) that the country’s 2010 GDP growth rate
would be between 2.1 and 4.1.
5See however (Schlag and Weele 2009) and studies cited therein for a related approach.
2decades (Brier 1950) and used in numerous studies. These tend to show
that the use of PSR improves performance, in a sense of avoiding overly low
probabilities being assigned to particular outcomes (which may be heavily
penalized by PSR). More generally, reviews such as (Smith and Walker 1993)
prove that incentives often make a diﬀerence in economic experiments.
The study that is perhaps closest to mine is (Van Lenthe 1993) that actu-
ally uses PSR for continuous distributions to encourage faithful reporting of
CIs. To this end, the author asks the subjects for the lower bound, best guess
and higher bound for a number of variables expressed as fractions. Then he
assumes that the underlying distribution is a beta distribution, estimates it
given the three reported values and scores using the PSR. Obviously, the
assumption of beta distribution is problematic, and it is not clear how this
kind of approach should be generalized to variables with support beyond the
unit interval. 6 Another study that tried to incentivize proper calibration
for intervals was (Dargnies and Hollard 2008). The authors ﬁnd the impact
of an incentivized calibration training session in men only but even then it
does not seem to be signiﬁcant. The reward scheme is not incentive compat-
ible and, curiously enough, the control group subjects were told “they would
receive remuneration regarding this task but that they would only know how
the remuneration was established later.”
In this study, I develop and implement a simple scoring rule for CIs
that is relatively easy to comprehend and puts no assumptions on subjects’
subjective probability distributions.
The experiment conﬁrms the eﬃcacy of the proposed incentivization pro-
cedure - it makes subjects’ reported CIs 26% wider. As a result overconﬁ-
dence (the diﬀerence between the required conﬁdence level of 90% and the
frequency with which the reported intervals actually cover the unknown real
value, henceforth: the hit rate) is reduced by 14 pct. points. These treat-
ment eﬀects are comparable or stronger than the impact of other investigated
interventions (namely explicit warnings and feedback) and continue to op-
erate when combined with them. However, even when all three measures
are applied, subjects remain overconﬁdent and there is no evidence of any of
them reporting overly wide intervals.
2 Proper scoring rule for conﬁdence intervals
Consider an individual holding a subjective belief about an unknown value
described by a cumulative probability distribution function F(X). The indi-
6Additionally, the standard approach in the overconﬁdence research tradition is to ask
for the bounds only, not the most likely case.
3vidual is asked to report the =2 and the 1 =2 quantiles of the distribution,
denoted QL and QH respectively,7 for some  2 (0;1). Next, a single real-
ization of the variable following the subjective distribution (i.e. the true
value) is observed. The goal is to provide a loss function that will encourage
truthful reporting. Thus, if the reported values are xL and xH respectively
and the observed realization is x0, how should the payment for the individ-
ual, L(xL;xH;x0) be determined in order to induce reporting xL = QL and
xH = QH?








L(xL;xH;x0)dF(x0) = QL (1)
Fact 1 For a risk-neutral subject, the loss function, L(xL;xH;x0) =  
2(xH 
xL)   1(x0>xH)(x0   xH)   1x0<xL(xL   x0) induces truthful reporting of the
symmetric 1    condence interval.8
Proof Given subjective beliefs and the loss function, reporting any xL;xH



































= 1   F(xH): (4)
7In the case of a non-convex support resulting in an interval rather than single point
satisfying F(X) = =2, we take QL to be the the sup of this set. Similarly QH is the inf
over the set of values for which F(X) = 1   =2.
8Jose and Winkler (2009) make the same observation, additionally providing a more
general formula, applicable to diﬀerent sets of quantiles.
4as required and the SOC is obviously satisﬁed. QED.
The proposed function is obviously not unique but it can be shown that
it is unique up to trivial transformations in the class of functions additively
separable in xL and xH. While fairly simple (piece-wise linear in each ar-
gument and, for any (xL;xH) interval, symmetric around its midpoint), the
scheme may seem unnatural at ﬁrst. However, it has close analogues out-
side of the laboratory. For example, it is basically equivalent to the choice of
strike prices in the short strangle option strategy, in which the investor writes
out-of-the-money put and call options for the same maturity and underlying
asset, see Figure 1 This strategy is attractive if the investor expects relatively
little volatility, i.e. is quite conﬁdent about the future price of the asset. The
greater the diﬀerence between the strike prices, the lower the option premi-
ums she will earn (the only substantial diﬀerence wrt the proposed reward
scheme being that this relationship is not linear). Her losses in the case of
large price movements are generally unlimited.
Figure 1: Comparison of two short strangle strategies
Examples of similar loss functions penalizing careless setting of quantiles
of one’s subjective distribution also abound in other life domains. A typical
cell phone tariﬀ includes a ﬂat fee and relatively steep per-minute charges.
The higher the fee, the greater the number of “included minutes”. Grubb
(2009) is able to explain ex post tariﬀ choice “mistakes” in this market in
terms of customer overconﬁdence. By the same token, when driving to an
important meeting we implicitly trade oﬀ the likely minor inconvenience of
5having to wait for the others against the potentially very costly possibility of
coming too late. We are thus trying to leave enough time for the latter to be
quite unlikely (but many of us fail, i.e. ﬁnd themselves being late much more
often than they would like to, another case for overconﬁdence).9 A farmer
may underinsure against drought and ﬂood if he overestimates precision of
his precipitation forecasts. A manager responsible for the supply chain may
fail to provide suﬃcient warehouse capacity and emergency supply sources
given demand uncertainty and possible delays of the primary supplier etc.
The properness of the proposed scoring procedure rests on the assumption
of risk neutrality. Several studies show that some people violate it, even for
small stakes, and may behave in ways inconsistent with the expected utility
theory.
It can be shown that for any given subjective beliefs about the actual value
and any two intervals of which one is a proper subset of the other, the former
results in a more risky gamble, in terms of second-order stochastic dominance
of deviations from the respective means. If, therefore, subjects are risk-
averse, we expect them to provide wider intervals that will cover the actual
value more often than 90% of the time. Prospect theory of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) proposes that people will tend to overweight the probability
of unlikely events yielding particularly high or particularly low outcomes. In
our case, it will mean paying additional attention to the possibility of not
covering the actual value, which will again result in wider intervals.
The proposed procedure may be generalized to account for such de-
viations from risk neutrality in a way similar to (Oﬀerman, Sonnemans,
Van de Kuilen, and Wakker 2009). For this purpose, subject-level calibra-
tion could be performed involving elicitation of 1    conﬁdence intervals
for a variable known to follow a uniform distribution, say, on [0;1]. Such
L=2 and H=2 need to be found that subject would report the correct in-





2 xL  1(x0>xH)(x0  xH) 1x0<xL(xL  x0) (which could possibly
be rearranged to make it more transparent to the subjects). We would then
know that the L function should induce reporting correct 1  intervals for
variables following unknown subjective distribution. The question whether
this additional layer of complexity is rewarded with signiﬁcantly better cali-
bration is an empirical one and is left for future research.
9In some of such examples, the diﬀerence wrt. to the discussed reward scheme is
that we focus on one quantile only e.g. the driving time that is unlikely to be exceeded;
additionally, there may be non-linearity involved, e.g. it may not matter much any more
whether someone is 30 or 40 minutes late for a job interview.
63 Experimental design
The experiment seeking to verify the usefulness of the incentivizing scheme
described above was implemented as follows. The experiment was advertised
among registered subjects of the Laboratory of Experimental Economics at
the University of Warsaw using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Upon arriving in
the lab, each subject was randomly assigned to one of two treatments: the
Proper Scoring Treatment (PST) or Control Treatment (CT). Subjects were
not aware of the existence of the non-assigned treatment. All subjects read
the instructions explaining the task of providing 90% CIs for distances in
kilometers between twenty pairs of major European cities.1011 The English
translation of the instructions is provided in the appendix. Subjects in the
PST additionally learned about the loss function described in the previous
section. The losses were expressed in points, whereby 1000 points would
corresponded to 4 PLN (approx. 1 euro). For example, giving an interval of
(1000,1400) for the distance between Barcelona and Stockholm would result
in a loss of 20 points due to the interval width (:05  400) and 880 points
due to missed true value (2280 kilometers), to make an aggregate loss of 900
points or 3.6 PLN. Subjects in the PST would start the experiment with
12’000 points12 with no additional show-up fee, while subjects in the control
treatment would earn 30 PLN for sure.
Having read the instructions, subjects would start their z-tree (Fischbacher
2007) treatment, beginning with three trial periods. Next, three control
questions were asked, whereby subjects could only proceed by providing the
correct answer. Subjects were ﬁnally asked whether they were sure they un-
derstood the task and could then go on with providing 20 CIs for diﬀerent
distances. For the ﬁrst 10 questions, no feedback was given. After this block,
subjects were asked to guess how many of their 10 intervals covered the ac-
tual values. This question was not incentivized, for it would interfere with
behavior the interval setting task itself (“moral hazard problem” which may
10All subjects within a session were given the same questions in the same order, to
obtain maximum power of the treatment comparison. For each new session a new set of
questions was randomly picked from a set of distances between Europe’s 50 largest cities,
Warsaw excluded, in such a way that no city appeared twice in any session.
11Subjects were allowed to report the interval bounds up to the nearest kilometre but
in practice out of 4160 reported values only four were not multiples of 10; vast majority
were multiples of 100.
12This number was 10’000 in the ﬁrst session. However, it was subsequently increased
because average PST earnings were substantially lower in that session than average CT
earnings and quite a few PST subjects were close to bankruptcy. Note that having sub-
mitted “agnostic” intervals such as (0,5000), one would only lose 5000 points, half the
initial endowment in session 1, over the course of the experiment.
7or may not be important empirically). Subject then received joint feedback
on the ﬁrst block the number of questions for which the actual value was be-
low the lower bound, within the interval and above the upper bound. They
were also reminded at this point that appropriate 90% conﬁdence intervals
should typically yield nine hits in 10 trials.
In the second block of 10 questions, subjects would receive immediate
feedback: in the CT they would learn the true value; in the PST, additionally
the resulting value of the loss function (when appropriate, also disaggregated
into the two components: the one penalizing the width of the interval and the
one penalizing having missed the true value) was computed for the subjects.13
This design facilitated making a distinction between two alternative hy-
potheses: that proper scoring leads to (more) truthful reporting directly and
that it operates via strengthened feedback. The opposite order of blocks was
not considered, because feedback on early intervals would be expected to spill
over on subsequent, no-feedback questions. The design admittedly makes it
more diﬃcult to distinguish between the impact of feedback and temporal
factors such as boredom, but, unless the latter take a rather implausible
step-wise form, without any within-block eﬀects, such identiﬁcation is still
possible.
On top of the PST/CT sample split an additional manipulation was also
performed. Instructions in the last two sessions were supplemented with a
“hint”. It read that similar studies in the past and previous sessions of the
very same experiment showed that most people give overly narrow intervals,
so that on average out of 10 reported intervals only four or ﬁve would cover
the true value. It was stressed that especially the higher bound is generally
too low. Therefore, it was recommended to provide wider intervals than one
would intuitively be inclined to do. Similar “cheap talk” interventions were
used before (e.g. Block and Harper (1991)).
This additional manipulation was performed between- rather than within-
session because we obviously could not truthfully and responsibly give this
kind of advice without ﬁrst obtaining a suﬃciently large sample indeed con-
ﬁrming the pre-hypothesized bias for the relevant type of questions, pool of
subjects and with or without incentives. Additionally, handling four diﬀerent
treatments in a single session would be somewhat cumbersome (e.g. PST-
13The actual distances and resulting losses were not included in the joint feedback after
the ﬁrst block to reduce the likelihood of wealth eﬀects. For example, a subject ﬁnding
out that she only had 7’000 points left after the ﬁrst block and aiming to earn at least 20
PLN (requiring 5’000 points) could revert to the strategy of providing intervals of width
equal to 4’000 km so that she would be quite sure to lose only 200 points per any of the
remaining 10 questions. It was speculated that ignorance concerning current total losses
would encourage considering each question separately.
8hint subjects’ instructions would have been more than twice as long as those
of CT-baseline ones).
Introducing the hint served two purposes: ﬁrstly, to obtain a sense of
how the size of the main treatment eﬀects compares to other interventions.
Secondly, to see if perhaps providing incentives to a subject warned about the
bias could lead to “overcorrection” (reporting wider intervals than necessary).
Clearly, this would speak against the incentivization method.
One hundred and six student subjects participated in the ﬁve sessions of
the study. Depending on the show-up, the number varied from 16 in session
4 to 23 in sessions 1 and 5. About half majored in economics, 55% were
male. Mean age was 22.2.
One of the subjects dropped out having read the instructions (and learned
about possible ﬁnancial losses). One subject dropped out after question no.17
due to other obligations. Both of these were removed from further analysis.
Three subjects in the PST treatment went bankrupt but continued playing.
One of them made a positive proﬁt in the end, because all participants were
given additional 5 PLN due to longer than expected duration of the session.
Of the two others, one covered the losses (and vowed never to participate
in experiments again). The other refused to do so and the experimenter felt
that the amount in question (1.5 euro) did not justify litigation.
Average earnings were about 30 PLN for a session of 40 to 60 minutes.
4 Results
4.1 Treatment eﬀects
Table 1 shows means of key statistics for the two treatments (the entries in
the last column will be explained later on).
It can be immediately seen that incentivized subjects submitted wider
intervals (with higher upper bounds), and as a results covered the true value
more often. It must be noted, however, that the hit rate for the PST was still
far below the correct value of .9. Averaging over all choices made by each
individual, we obtain individual hit rates. Binomial test rejects the correct
calibration hypothesis at 5% level for subjects with less then 16 hits (hit rates
of .75 and less). It turns out that all CT subjects and 43 out of 51 subjects in
the PST fall into this category. No subject reached or exceeded the hit rate
of 90%. It should also be noted that the higher hit rate appears to be due
to interval width only – the absolute distance between the midpoint of the
interval and the actual value (“distance” in table 1) did not diﬀer between
the treatments.
9Table 1: Treatment comparison, 2-sided tests of signicance
Cont. Tr. Prop. Sc. Tr. signiﬁcance
number of subjects 53 51 x
lower bound 976:8 950:9 n.s.
upper bound 1681:2 1838:0 subject, p < :05
interval width 704:5 887:1 subject, p < :05
hit rate 41:0% 55:0% subject, p < :01
distance 510:9 513:0 n.s.
response time 32:9 40:6 subject, p < :01
total loss per period 286:8 256:8 session, p = :063
The last row of the table reports the number of points lost per period. Of
course, these ﬁgures were payoﬀ-relevant for PST subjects only. It turns out
that thanks to their wider intervals, the incentivized group lost less points
than the control group.
As usual with experiment treatment eﬀects, signiﬁcance of these results
can be tested at three levels. The most conservative approach involves treat-
ing each session as just one independent variable. For each variable in Table
1 we have compared the number of cases where the entry for a PST subject
was below the median for the session with the number of cases where it was
above the median. It is found that PST subjects’ total loss in a given period
was more often above the session median than below it for each of the ﬁve
sessions (p value of 2 4 or 6.25% for a two sided alternative hypothesis).
The less conservative approach envisages tests which treat choices made
by diﬀerent subjects as independent. Because the experiment involved no in-
teraction between the participants, communication was prevented and session-
level eﬀects, if any, were orthogonal to the treatment eﬀects, it seems justiﬁed
to test at subject level. For this purpose, subject-speciﬁc average was calcu-
lated for each variable of interest and the treatment eﬀect was tested using
the median, ranksum and t tests. The p values for the three tests are quite
similar and conﬁrm the results of eye-balling: the impact of treatment on
the lower bound of the interval is never signiﬁcant, the changes in the upper
bound and width are signiﬁcant, at 5% level; the change in the number of
penalty points due to a missed true value is signiﬁcant at 10% level and the
change in the number of intervals covering the true value—at 1% level. The
results do not change when weights are used to account for slightly unequal
assignment to treatments within session (the fraction of incentivized subjects
varied from 45.5% to 53.3% due to the odd number of subjects showing up
10and due to drop-outs).
The third possibility, taking individual choices as independent observa-
tions, does not seem appropriate to test for treatment eﬀects due to possible
interdependence of choices made by any individual. We note that even under
this approach no impact of the treatment on the lower bound of the interval
can be detected.
It was also found that PST subjects took on average approx. 7.7 seconds
more to answer each question than CT subjects (on top of taking much more
time to read their longer instructions), possibly indicating that they put more
eﬀort in providing appropriate values.14 However, there was no diﬀerence in
self-reported focus on the task during the experiment.
Regarding the eﬀect of the hint, it could be assessed by comparing be-
havior in the ﬁrst three sessions against the last two sessions, as mentioned
before. To set the stage for a meaningful test, it was ﬁrst established that
session dummies had no joint signiﬁcant impact on behavior and there was no
trace of a time pattern (which could have resulted e.g. from dissemination of
information regarding the nature of the experiment among the participants
or selective self-assignment to sessions). It turned out that the hint increased
the average width of the interval by some 131 kilometers, thus somewhat less
than proper scoring. This eﬀect approaches signiﬁcance in a one-sided t-test
only (p = :064), although the power of the test is not comparable to that for
the main treatment eﬀect because subjects faced diﬀerent questions. Also
the hit rate increased slightly (from 46.6% to 50.1%, n.s.).
4.2 The role of feedback and learning
As mentioned before, subjects would receive no feedback to the ﬁrst 10 sub-
mitted intervals. Mean hit rates in this block were 32:6% and 50:4% for the
CT and PST treatments respectively. When subsequently asked to guess how
many of their intervals actually covered the true value, they reported 6:09 and
7:18 on average. Thus, participants correctly recognized that their intervals
were too narrow but underestimated the extent to which that was the case.
The same pattern was observed before, e.g. in (Sniezek and Buckley 1991).
Let us now see how subjects reacted to the information concerning their ac-
tual hit rate. Figure 2 shows for each treatment separately, the evolution of
the hit rate over time, for each of the ﬁve sessions separately and jointly for
all sessions.
Several observations can readily be made. First, the hit rate varies sub-
stantially between questions. Second, it hardly ever reaches the proper cal-























Figure 2: Evolution of hit rate, by treatment and session
12ibration level of 90%. Third, there seems to be an upward trend over time,
although it may be solely the impact of feedback operating from period 11
onwards. Fourth, except for the level shift (which corresponds to the treat-
ment eﬀect discussed before), the patterns for PST and CT seem quite similar
in each session. Finally, also between-session comparison shows rather simi-
lar behaviour, except that for some reason the main treatment eﬀect seems
weaker in session 5.
To quantify these observations, we have estimated panel logit models
explaining whether any given interval covered the true value or not, see table
2.
Model 1 involves ﬁxed eﬀects for subjects and hence time-variant vari-
ables only, Model 2 – additionally the main treatment variable and subject
characteristics; Model 3 adds interaction between the treatment and block
(feedback/no feedback) and period. The signiﬁcance of the main treatment
eﬀect and non-signiﬁcance of the positive impact of the hint is conﬁrmed.
The time course has no direct impact per se, but feedback makes subjects
cover the true value more often: the impact is about as strong as that of
incentivization. Interactions turn out to be non-signiﬁcant.
Expectedly, more time spent answering the question leads to higher hit
rates. Regarding subject characteristics, individuals who self-declared to
have been more focused during the task and males obtained higher hit rates.
Notably, males outperformed females in that they covered more true values
despite having reported signiﬁcantly narrower intervals. It may have to do
with their presumed superior spatial orientation as well as more experience
with long-distance driving and planning thereof. Age or academic major were
not signiﬁcant, nor was self-declared willingness to take risk or geographic
knowledge.
5 Conclusion
It is widely believed that interval overconﬁdence is a rather common and
persistent feature of human perception. Accordingly, the notion has been
extensively applied in behavioral ﬁnance and other ﬁelds. To date, how-
ever, experimental evidence has been solely based on hypothetical questions,
raising the natural question of, whether proper incentives can mitigate the
bias.
The present study revealed that a simple proper scoring mechanism for
conﬁdence intervals is feasible. It may not only be applied in laboratory
experiment, but also in the ﬁeld, wherever veriﬁable expert interval estimates
are sought. For example, options (the strangle strategy) may be used to
13Table 2: Logit regression













True value/1000 -.468*** -.493*** -.493***
[.857] [.084] [.084]














Model 1 involves ﬁxed eﬀects for subjects, models 2 and 3 – random eﬀects. Standard
errors in brackets. Stars indicate signiﬁcance at 5%, 1% and 0.1% levels.
cheaply provide strong incentives to provide accurate CIs for stock exchange
indices. The proposed score may also be calculated ex post, even for non-
incentivized CIs, to provide a generic measure of judgment or prediction
quality. Additionally, it serves as a simple check regarding information needs
of a consumer of an expert opinion – if she feels uncomfortable with the
14proposed loss function, then perhaps CIs is not what she needs after all.
The use of the method indeed reduces overconﬁdence signiﬁcantly, at least
as much as the alternative interventions under scrutiny. Nevertheless, it is
by no means able to remove it entirely. While robustness of overconﬁdence in
interval estimation tasks appears to be conﬁrmed, the availability of a proper
scoring method now calls for replicating the results that had been obtained
using hypothetical questions, comparing i.a. individuals vs. groups, males vs.
females and professional vs. novice judges, hard vs. easy, representative vs.
unrepresentative questions etc. Similarly, it is worth checking whether dis-
turbing phenomena related to interval judgments, such as insensitivity of in-
terval width to required conﬁdence level (Teigen and Jørgensen 2005) persist
when incentives are present. The empirical performance of the straightfor-
ward extension of the method to more than two quantiles of the distribution
should be assessed.
The proposed method may also be subject to further development. Risk
non-neutrality can be dealt with as mentioned before, at a cost of additional
time and complexity. Applications to cases where the value to be estimated
depends in part on expert’s own decisions, such as project leader providing
conﬁdence intervals for the project duration, will also require extra care. In
particular, punishing overly quick completion as envisaged by the method in
its present form will typically be undesirable.
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Appendix: instructions [translated from Pol-
ish]
[...] During the experiment you will be asked about distances (“as the
crow ﬂies”) between pairs of European cities. You will probably not know
the exact values, only approximations.
Your task will be to provide in each case an interval covering
(containing) the unknown value with a probability of 90%.
In other words, you should be 90% sure that the actual value is
between the two numbers you are submitting.
The more precisely you can determine any given distance, the narrower
the interval that you should give. Suppose for example that you are being
asked about the distance between Zurich and Oslo. If you give a very narrow
interval, say between 1050 and 1055 km, you will most probably not cover
the actual value (unless it seems to you that you remember this particular
number with great precision). The probability that your narrow interval
covers the true value is, in your own view, likely much lower than 90%.
Submitting a very wide interval, e.g. between 200 and 8000 km, is a mistake,
too—(almost) everyone will admit that such an interval will surely (with
100% rather than 90% probability) cover the true distance between Zurich
and Oslo. Providing an interval of (700,1350) seems a better idea. Somebody
else, more sure about his or her knowledge (and perceiving the distance as
larger), can give a narrower interval, e.g. (1200 do 1550).
We would like you to give such an interval that would make the
probability that the true value is higher than the upper bound of
your interval, as well as the probability that the true value is lower
than the lower bound of your interval, each equal to 5%, according
to your best judgment.
In other words, you should be 95% sure that the true value is
higher than the lower of the two numbers you are reporting and
95% sure that the true value is lower than the higher one.
You are asked to think carefully before each answer.
[what follows was used in the PST only]
To make your thinking pay we will implement a procedure link-
ing your earnings to the intervals you are submitting and the actual
18values.
You will start the experiment with 12’000 points. At the end of
the experiment each 1000 points will be worth 4 PLN.
You will lose certain number of points with each question. Let
us denote the lower and upper bounds of an interval that you submit in
response to a question as LB and UB respectively. Let us also denote the
actual value as AV. Now, if it turns out that the interval does cover
the actual value, that is, LB  AV  UB, you will lose the number
of points equal to 5% of the width of your interval in kilometers,
i.e. 0:05(UB   LB) points.
If it turns out that your interval does not cover the actual value,
you will additionally lose the “missing” distance. That is, if AV >
UB, you will additionally lose AV   UB. If AV < LB, you will
additionally lose LB   AV .
Let us consider an example. Suppose that you have submitted the inter-
val (700,1350) for the distance between Zurich and Oslo. Suppose it turned
out that the actual value is 900km. That is, we have LB = 700;UB =
1350;AV = 900. Your interval covers the actual value. You will lose
0:05(1350   700) = 32;5 points. If it turned out, however, that your in-
terval does not cover the true value, for example, the distance is AV = 1750,
you would lose much more, namely you will additionally lose the number of
kilometers that is missing to cover the true value, in this case, AV   UB =
1750   1350 = 400, so you will jointly lose 432:5 points. Similarly, if it
turned out that the actual value is just 650 km, you would additionally lose
LB   AV = 700   650 = 50, so 83:5 in total.
Note that in order to keep 0:05(UB   LB) low, you should give a fairly
narrow interval. On the other hand, submitting a narrow interval, you will
more often lose points because of not having covered the actual value (and
these “penalties”, should they occur, will tend to be (much) higher than if
you had given a wide interval). The penalty associated with the interval
width UB   LB is multiplied by the factor of 0:05. It can be proven that
because of this the best thing you can do when trying to maximize your
expected payoﬀ is submitting such an interval that you expect the actual
value to be lower than your reported lower bound (LB) with a probability of
5% and higher than your reported upper bound (UB) also with a probability
of 5%. As a result, your interval will cover the actual value with the remaining
probability of 90%. If you want to see the formal proof of this fact, please
ask the experimenter.
[information about the timeline of the experiment and about payments—
skipped here]
To the best of our judgment, obtaining a negative outcome at the end of
19the experiment is very unlikely, as long as you do not take the task too lightly.
Should it happen, however, you will have to cover the missing amount with
your own money.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. If everything is clear,
please press the button to proceed to the trial periods.
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